Welcome to analyzing a
Real-World Large-Scale Attack of Target brought to you by IBM. In this series of videos, you will learn to analyze
the Target attack scenario. Even though you might
wonder why we use a case study of the Target
breach that happened in 2013, it is very important as an illustration of
what can happen to a corporation that experiences
such a large attack. The facts of the breach
were publicly announced, which allows us to give an extensive timeline for
educational purposes. Many university programs still
use this breach as well. During this course, you
will be introduced to a total of five
breach case studies, and one watering
hole attack example. The information on
these breaches were public and cited in
various publications, and is part of online blogs. Pay special attention to the format in which the
breaches are presented, as you will need to put
together your own case study at the end of this course as part of your grade for this course. The case study research will help you learn a
critical skill in a cyber security analyst's
job in recognizing and categorizing types of vulnerabilities and
associated attacks. You will not be expected to put together as detailed
of a timeline, since an attack you research
may not have been as publicly documented or may
have occurred recently, which will result in
your documentation of current litigation or cause of the breach that may still be reported in the future. A breach may result
in an impact to your corporation
for years to come. Let's take a look at
this very public breach. The Target Corporation is an
American retailing company, founded in 1902 and headquartered in
Minneapolis, Minnesota. It's the second largest
discount retailer in the United States. Target operates 1,916 stores
in the United States, and also began operations
in Canada in March of 2013. In December 2013,
a data breach of Target's systems effected up
to 110 million customers. According to the X-Force Threat Intelligence Index produced by the IBM X-Force
Incident Response and Intelligence Services in 2020, the retail industry was the
second most attacked of all industries according
to 2019 X-Force data. This sector was
affected by 16 percent of all attacks on the
top 10 industries, a marked increase from
its fourth place rank and 11 percent of attacks in 2018. This industry experienced
the second largest number of network attacks in 2019. The retail industry made it to the second position
in 2019 based on X-Force IRIS data and publicly disclosed data
breach information. The most common type of threat actors targeting
retail organizations are financially motivated
cyber criminals who target the industry to obtain consumer Personally
Identifiable Information, or PII, Payment Card Data, financial data, shopping history, and loyalty program information. Cyber criminals typically use this data to take over
customer accounts, defraud customers, and reuse the data in various
identity theft scenarios. A popular attack technique used by cyber criminals to target retailers in 2019 was
point-of-sale malware, and e-commerce payment
card skimming, each aiming to siphon payment
card information during the transaction via physical payment terminals
or online respectively. You'll be asked to refer to the X-Force Threat
Intelligence Index, and other whitepapers
frequently in these courses, and could use the
information on the industry breach you choose for your
peer-to-peer project. As you see in the data for 2019, the attack that happened to Target is still prevalent today. In November and December of 2013, cyber thieves executed a successful cyber
attack against Target, one of the largest retail
companies in the United States. The attackers gained access
to Target's computer network, stole the financial and
personal information of as many as 110 million
Target customers, and then removed the
sensitive information from Target's network to a
server in Eastern Europe. John Mulligan, Target's Executive Vice President and Chief
Financial Officer, testified that his
company "had in place multiple layers
of protection, including firewalls,
malware detection software, intrusion detection, and prevention capabilities and data loss prevention tools." He further stated that
the Target had been certified in September 2013 as compliant with the
Payment Card Industry Data Security
Standards or PCI-DSS, which credit card companies
require before allowing merchants to process credit
and debit card payments, and yet a breach occurred. We will discuss a similar
breach at Home Depot later in the course to
showcase a couple of items. Even though a breach
is very public, it might not stop
another corporation from experiencing
the same attacks, and no corporation is
safe from cyber attacks. You may have learned the
phases of the intrusion kill chain by Lockheed
Martin in earlier courses. We will use this model as a basis for our discussion
of this breach. Roughly at the same time when Target was PCI-DSS Certified, the first phase of this
attack were executed. In the first
reconnaissance phase, the attacker gathered as much information
about the victim. In this case, the attackers were able to find information about a Targets third-party vendor through simple Internet searches. Target even displayed a public Internet portal
for vendors which gave away the kind
of software that was used for their
online vendor billing. Equipped with this knowledge, the attacker then started their recognizance on one
particular vendor, Fazio. In the weaponization phase, the attackers created
malware stricken e-mails likely attached in a PDF or
Microsoft Office document. In the first part of
the delivery phase, the attacker set
infected e-mails to the vendor and the
so-called phishing attack. Once deployed, the
malware started to record passwords and provided the attackers with their key to targets external billing system. In the second part of
the delivery phase, the attackers leveraged
their access to the vendor system to
enter targets network. Weak security at the perimeter of Targets network may
have contributed to the attacker's
success in breaching the most sensitive areas of targets network containing
cardholder data. Using the vendor's credentials to gain access to Targets
inner network, it appears the attackers then
directly uploaded their RAM scraping malware to
the POS terminals. In the exploitation phase, the RAM scrapie malware and exfiltration malware
began recording millions of card
swipes and storing the stolen data for
later exfiltration. Report suggests that the attacker maintain access to
the vendor system for some time while attempting
to further breach Target's network during
the installation phase. It is unclear exactly how the attacker could've
escalated into access from the external
billing system to deeper layers of Target's
internal network. But given the installation of the black POS malware and
Target's POS terminals, the compromise of
70 million records of non-financial data, and the compromise of the internal Target's servers
used to gather stolen data, it appears that the attacker
succeeded in moving through various key target
systems by exploiting default account names and
Target's IT management system. Based on the reported
timeline and the breach, the attackers had access to Target's internal network
for over a month and compromise internal servers with exfiltration malware
by November 30th. While the exact method
by which the attackers maintained command and
control is unknown, it is clear that the attackers were able to maintain the line of communication between
the outside Internet and Target's cardholder network. The attackers transmitted the stolen data to
outside servers, at least one of
which was located in Russia in plain text via FTP, a standard method
for transferring files over the
course of two weeks. On December 12th, the US Department of Justice
notified Target that their stolen credit
card credentials have been identified in a Russian dark website where
they were offered for sale. At this point in time, no one in Target had realized
that there was an attack. Target immediately started
intense investigations and was able to stop further
activities to exfiltrate data. Three days later, most of the
malware had been removed. It was at this time when
Target found out not only about the loss of 40 million
credit card records, but also an additional 70
million customer data records without financial information. Revisiting the
investigative timeline shows the first security
relevant events from FireEye and
Symantec Endpoint were recorded on November 30th. Firewall and Endpoint analysts may have disregarded these events as false positives because
no action was initiated. The reason for that can be founded in the complexity where those point solutions do not communicate with one another. It is hard to retrieve additional activity
information about the preceding and following traffic and to realize business and network
contexts by just looking at an individual incident without any correlation. The ability to include business contexts and
risk management can show if any high-value assets are exposed by a certain
attack pattern. Network contacts
shows if those assets can be physically
reached by the malware. Without the means for correlating
the individual events, the attack was ignored. Once the exfiltration began, the Target security tools
recorded more alerts. But again, without
proper correlation to the earlier events and
network traffic logs, there was simply not
enough visibility into the ongoing malware deployment
and data exfiltration. This resulted in the fact that the ongoing attack was
still being ignored. At the time when the DOJ called the Target
executive management, it was too late to react. The started forensic
investigation enabled the security team to find
malware on POS terminal and on backend data
servers as well as ongoing exfiltration
transmissions to external FTP servers. The communication lines
were then severed and the malware removed
from the systems. Only within their
forensic activities, the security staff
found out about the additional 70 million
non-financial data records that have been compromised. It was an awakening of the
worst-case business scenario any organization
could possibly face. In the next video, we will review the
vulnerabilities, costs, and a few of the
preventive techniques which would have
allowed Target to discover the attack sooner or in the best case,
prevented the attack.